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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:
Case No. 20001114-CA

v.

:

JOYCE POWELL,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of a clandestine laboratory in
drug-free zone, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp.
2001), in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Ray M. Harding, Sr., presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)0)(1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request to
submit an exhibit into evidence where that document was merely cumulative of testimony
already given?

1

Standard of Review: "In reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of
evidence . . . , [an appellate court] will not overturn the court's determination unless it was
an "abuse of discretion." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993); accord State
v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 979 (1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following are reproduced in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-5 (Supp. 2001);
Utah R. Evid. 608;
Utah R. Evid. 403.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with possession of a clandestine laboratory"
in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony. R. 1-2. A jury convicted defendant as charged.
R. 112. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of five-years-to-life
in the Utah State Prison. R. 123; 140. Defendant timely appeals her conviction. R. 129.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On February 16,2000, defendant spent the day gathering laboratory equipment,
including a home-made condenser, in preparation for condensing methamphetamine oil
into usable methamphetamine. R. 143:65-71, 77-79. That evening, defendant and her
two friends, Joann Ford and Michael Westbrook, brought the lab equipment to a room at

1

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, J 2, 12 P.3d 92.
2

the Western Inn Motel in Spanish Fork. R. 142:59-60; 143:79-81, 86-87, 90. Defendant
called her boyfriend, Brian Marchant, and asked him to pick up the methamphetamine oil
which she had "cooked" several days earlier, and bring it to the motel. R. 143:20-21, 6869, 78. Defendant then offered set-up instructions and helped her two inexperienced
friends construct the lab. R. 143:25-27, 29, 49-52, 54-56, 69, 80-81, 86-90. A short time
later, Marchant and his friend Brian Libbey arrived. R. 143:78. Around 11:00 p.m.
defendant gave Ford and Westbrook instructions on condensing the meth oil, and they
began the condensing process in the bathroom. R. 143:25-27, 29, 49-52, 54-56, 69, 7981, 86-90. Defendant then went to sleep on the bed nearest the outside window. R.
143:29-30, 81-82.
The bust. Acting on an informant's tip, Detective Richard Hales observed the
comings and goings of defendant and her friends from their motel room for over an hour
that night. R. 142:60-67. At one point, Detective Hales observed defendant and Ford
carrying various items including grocery sacks into the motel room. R. 142:64-65. Based
on that investigation, Detective Hales obtained a no-knock warrant. R. 142:67-68.
In the early morning hours on February 17, 2000, after a failed attempt to open the
motel room door with a key, Detective Hales and several other officers forced the door
open with a metal ramming pole. R. 142:68-70. Inside the room, the officers
encountered Westbrook nearest the door and Ford in the bathroom breaking the glass lab
equipment in an attempt to destroy any evidence of the lab. R. 142:71, 73, 76. Defendant
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and Marchant were on the bed closest to the outside window, and Libbey was on the other
bed. R. 142:74-75. Steam and fluid were coming out of the pressurized cooking pan on a
heating mantle near the sink. R. 142:73. Some of the fluid, later determined to be an acid
base, landed on Detective Hales' sweatshirt, eating a hole in it. R. 142:73-74, 152. The
officers also discovered various other chemicals in the room used to produce meth. R.
142:136-70, 192-205. Shortly thereafter, police arrested defendant, Ford, Westbrook,
Libbey, and Marchant. R. 1-2,4.
Trial testimony. At trial, Libbey and Ford testified about defendant's involvement
with the lab. R. 143:16-105. Libbey testified that defendant lay on the bed that evening
directing Ford and Westbrook to connect the condensing pump to the sink and instructing
them on how to use the sink to cook the meth. R. 143:27-29. Libbey heard defendant
repeatedly tell Ford and Westbrook "not to mess up [my] stuff." R. 143:29, 59-61. On
the night of his arrest, when police asked Libbey who was involved in cooking the meth,
he told them that it was defendant. R. 143:56.
Libbey also testified that he had entered a plea agreement with officers in
exchange for his testimony against defendant. R. 143:18-19, 31-35. To confirm that
agreement, Libbey's attorney prepared a letter addressed to the prosecutor—Exhibit 38—
under Libbey's direction, detailing the events which occurred at the hotel the night of his
arrest. See Exhibit 38—a letterfromAttorney Randall Gaither addressed to the
prosecutor; attached as Addendum B.

The letter outlines what Libbey will testify to at
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trial. Id. At the bottom of the letter is an initialed and dated handwritten paragraph
indicating defendant's involvement with the meth lab. Id. At trial, Libbey answered
numurous questions regarding Exhibit 38 during both direct and cross examination, and
discussed in detail the contents of that document, its history, and its format. R. 143:2829, 35-45,49-52.
Ford also testified for the prosecution at trial. R. 143:64-103. Ford told the jury
that she and defendant had cooked the meth oil several days earlier, and that she went
with defendant on February 16, 2000 to Salt Lake, where defendant picked up the
homemade condensing tubefromher friend. R. 143:67-69,77-78. Ford had never used a
pressure cooking pan to condense meth, so that night defendant showed Ford and
Westbrook how to set up the lab. R. 143:80-81, 86, 89-90,102. Then, while lying in bed,
defendant gave them further instructions on running the lab. R. 143:81.2
2

At trial, defendant argued that Ford was not credible because she had acted as a
confidential informant for Officer Sean Bufton. R. 143:5-8. Prior to her trial, Ford
agreed to act as a confidential informant on a matter unrelated to defendant's case or trial.
Id. In exchange for Ford's agreement, Bufton wrote a letter to the judge in Ford's case,
indicating Ford's redeeming work with the police. R. 143:5-6. Ford's work as a
confidential informant ended, however, prior to defendant's prosecution began. R.
143:12-13. At trial, defendant asked the court's permission to question Ford about
Bufton's letter. R. 143:6-7. The trial court denied defendant's request stating that the
letter would be highly prejudicial, but it did allow defendant to question Ford about her
working relationship with Bufton. R. 143:8-9, 13-14.
Unlike Libbey, Ford received no promisefromthe police, Bufton, or the
prosecutor in exchange for her testimony. R. 143:96-99,103,115. Ford considered
Bufton to be a friend. R. 143:76,96-98. Because of her good relationship with Bufton,
when he asked her to testify against defendant, Ford agreed to do so. R. 143:96-99,103,
115. At trial, Ford testified that her only motive in testifying against defendant was to
"tell the truth." R. 96-99.

5

ARGUMENT SUMMARY
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying her request to submit Exhibit
38, the letter from Libbey's attorney to the prosecutor outlining Libbey's testimony and
noting defendant's involvement with meth lab, into evidence as impeachment evidence.
Defendant's claim fails, however, because during Libbey's testimony he restated Exhibit
38, describing it in great detail. Because the jury was plainly aware of the content and
history of that document, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying its
admission as needlessly cumulative under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.
In any event, where Ford's testimony strongly corroborated Libbey's statements
about defendant's involvement with the meth lab, defendant cannot show that she was
prejudiced by the trial court's action.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
REQUEST TO SUBMIT EXHIBIT 38 INTO
EVIDENCE; IN ANY EVENT, BECAUSE IT WAS
MERELY CUMULATIVE OF A DETAILED IN-COURT
DESCRIPTION OF THAT DOCUMENT, ANY ERROR
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION REQUEST
WAS HARMLESS
Defendant claims that the trial court's decision not to admit Exhibit 38 was in
error. Br. of Aplt. at 10-12. Specifically, defendant claims that the document should
have been admitted under rule 608(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, as impeachment evidence
establishing co-defendant Libbey's alleged motive to misrepresent defendant's
6

involvement with the meth lab. Id. Defendant's claim lacks merit because the document
defendant sought to admit was merely cumulative evidence.
During direct examination at trial, the prosecutor asked Libbey to explain
defendant's involvement with the lab. R. 143:27. Libbey replied that defendant was
answering Westbrook and Ford's questions, "telling them what to do[,]"and how to hook
the apparatus up to the sink. Id. In response to further questioning by the prosecutor,
Libbey then testified that while acting under his attorney's advice, he had previously
filled out an affidavit indicating his observations that night. R. 143:28. At that point, the
following colloquy occurred between Libbey and the prosecutor:
PROSECUTOR:

Okay. Let me show you what—if I can, I am going to
show you what has been marked as Exhibit 38 for
identification and ask you to examine that more. Let
me have you turn over the page. There is a paragraph
written in handwriting, paragraph 8, do you recognize
that?

LIBBEY:

Okay. Yeah.

PROSECUTOR:

Okay. Did you write that or did your attorney write
that?

LIBBEY:

My attorney wrote it.

PROSECUTOR:

Okay. And did you tell him what to write there?

LIBBEY:

Yeah. He wrote it based on like things I told him and
then he went back and that was, you know, like what
was important.

PROSECUTOR:

Okay. Can you read paragraph 8 for us?
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LIBBEY:

Yeah, [defendant] kept telling the two persons
condensing the liquid not to mess up her stuff. She
gave instructions to run the pump into the sink.
And that is basically what I said.

R. 143:28-29.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Libbey to review Exhibit 38. R.
143:35-36. During that colloquy, defense counsel asked detailed questions about Exhibit
38 and received a complete description of that document from Libbey. R. 143:35-45, 4952. That description included 1) the name and address at the top of the document; 2) the
location of paragraph eight at the bottom of the page; 3) the fact that only paragraph eight
is handwritten as opposed to the seven preceding typewritten paragraphs; 4) an
identification of the attorney's handwritten initials next to paragraph eight; 5) the specific
content of each of the preceding seven paragraphs; 6) the date at the top of the letter and
the date handwritten next to paragraph eight; 7) a history of the events surrounding the
creation of that document, including who wrote the document, who was present when it
was created, and where it was created; and 8) the nature of defendant's mental condition
when Exhibit 38 was created. Id.
Following the close of Libbey's testimony after additional questioning on both redirect and re-cross examination, defense counsel requested that Exhibit 38 be submitted
into evidence so that the "jury [could] see the distinction between the typewritten portion
and the handwritten portion of that letter." R. 143:52-63. The court denied that request
without explanation. R. 143:64.
8

A.

Because Exhibit 38 was described in complete detail during Libbey's
testimony, the trial court acted within its discretion in not admitting the
exhibit
Rule 608(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that "[bjias, prejudice or any

motive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the
witness or by evidence otherwise adduced." Utah R. Evid. 608(c). Rule 608(c) is
limited, however, by rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. State v. Hackford, 1Z1 P.2d 200,
203 (Utah 1987). "[R]ule [403] permits the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence only
'if its probative value is substantially outweighed b y . . . considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.'" Id. (quoting Utah R.
Evid. 403). Accordingly, "[i]n reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of
evidence under rule 403, [an appellate court] will not overturn the court's determination
unless it was an "abuse of discretion." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1221 (Utah 1993);
accord State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 979
(1993). Although it is preferable to have express findings regarding the factors mentioned
in rule 403, "in the absence of such findings, [an appellate court] will still affirm if [it]
can find some basis in the record for concluding that the trial court's action falls within
the limits of permissible discretion under Rule 403." Hackford, 1YI P.2d at 203-04
(citing State v. Paterson, 656 P.2d 438,438 (Utah 1982)).
Here, although the trial court offered no express findings for its denial of
defendant's request to submit Exhibit 38 into evidence, the record clearly reveals that the

9

exhibit was merely cumulative of Libbey's verbatim discription of that document, and
therefore needlessly cumulative under rule 403. Upon offering Exhibit 38 for admission
into evidence, defense counsel stated that his reason for offering that document was to
make the jury aware of "the distinction between the typewritten portion and the
handwritten portion of that letter." SeeR. 143:52-63. However, defendant offers no
explanation as to how the handwriting shows bias, prejudice, or motive to misrepresent.
See Br. of Aplt. at 9-12. Furthermore, given defense counsel's prior diligent efforts
eliciting detailed testimony from Libbey concerning the content of Exhibit 38, the jury
was plainly aware of the fact that paragraph eight was handwritten, initialed, and dated, as
opposed to the preceding seven paragraphs which were typewritten at an earlier time. See
R. 143:35-45,49-52. Additionally, the jury was aware of each of the events surrounding
the creation of that document and that only paragraph eight addressed defendant's
involvement with the lab. See id. Accordingly, the probative value of Exhibit 38 was
substantially diminished by Libbey's verbatim restatement of that document. See Utah R.
Evid. 403. Cf. State v. Knowles, 709 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1985) (transcripts amounting
only to verbatim restatements of the witness' in-court testimony were found to be
cumulative). Thus the trial court acted within its discretion in denying defendant's
request to submit Exhibit 38 into evidence.3

3

Moreover, where defendant was able to show the possibility of bias, prejudice, or
motive to misrepresent for impeachment purposes by cross-examining Libbey regarding
Exhibit 38, any further evidence including the document itself, was needless. See Utah R.
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B.

Given convincing corroborative testimony from co-defendant Ford, regarding
defendant's involvement with the meth lab, the trial court's denial of
defendant's request to submit Exhibit 38 into evidence was harmless.
Defendant also claims that she was prejudiced by the trial court's denial of her

request to submit Exhibit 38 into evidence. Br. of Aplt. at 12. Whether an error is
harmless depends on such factors as "'the importance of the witness' testimony in the
prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of
evidence collaborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points,
the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength
of the prosecution's case.'" Hackford, 111 P.2d at 205-06 (citing Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 476 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)). Each of these factors are met in the instant case. As
stated above, Exhibit 38 was merely cumulative of Libbey's in-court detailed description
of that document. Additionally, Libbey's testimony about defendant's involvement with
the lab was strongly corroborated by Ford's testimony. Even defendant conceded the
importance of Ford's testimony when during a in-chambers discussion, defendant argued
to the trial court that "the entire trial, weighs and turns on the credibility of Ms. Ford. She
is the one who is going to come in and say that [] the defendant was involved in the
laboratory, and I think her credibility is the main issue in this case." R. 143:6-7. Because

Evid. 403; Utah R. Evid. 608(c) ("[b]ias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by evidence
otherwise adduced.") (emphasis added). Accordingly, the evidence defendant sought to
admit was in fact admitted in the form of witness testimony. See id.
11

Ford had no ulterior motive to testify (see R. 143:96-99, 103, 115), and her testimony
nearly mirrored Libbey's testimony regarding defendant's involvement in the lab (see R.
143:80-81, 86, 89-90, 102), Ford's testimony proved to be the linchpin in the
prosecution's case against defendant. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of defendant's
request to submit Exhibit 38 was harmless.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ ^ _ day of October, 2001.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL

iY T^COLEMERE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

58-37d-5. Prohibited acts — First degree felony*
(1) A person who violates Subsection 58-37d-4(lXa), (b), (e), or (f) is guilty of
a first degree felony if the trier of fact also finds any one of the following
conditions occurred in adjunction with that violation:
(a) possession of a firearm;
(b) use of a booby trap;
(c) illegal possession, transportation, or disposal of hazardous or dangerous material or while transporting or causing to be transported
materials in furtherance of a clandestine laboratory operation, there was
created a substantial risk to human health or safety or a danger to the
environment;
(d) intended laboratory operation was to take place or did take place
within 500 feet of a residence, place of business, church, or school;
(e) clandestine laboratory operation actually produced any amount of a
specified controlled substance; or
(f) intended clandestine laboratory operation was for the production of
cocaine base or methamphetamine base.
(2) If the trier of fact finds that two or more of the conditions listed in
Subsections (lXa) through tf) of this section occurred in conjunction with the
violation, at sentencing for the first degree felony:
(a) probation shall not be granted;
(b) the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended; and
(c) the court shall not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense.
History: C. IMS, 5M7d-6\ enacted by L.
*
19*3, eh. 1 5 * f 5; 1997, elu 64,1 1 * 1998,
fc»
eh. 66,1 1; 3000, eh. 187, f 1.
Amendment Notes). — The 1998 amend*
I*
ment, effective May 4, 1998, inserted "or wss
s
n
conducted in the presence o f after "involved" in
Subsection UXe).
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1,2000,

deleted former Subsection (lXe), which concerned clandestine drug laboratory operations
involving or conducted in the presence of persons under 18. A similar provision was enacted
as Section 78-6-112.6.
Croee References. — Sentencing for felonies, H 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.

CLANDESTINE DRUG LAB ACT
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Lesser included offenses.
Sufficiency of evidence,

controlled substance precursor as a lesser included offense of operating a methamphetamine laboratory. State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT
98, 989 P2d 1066.

Lesser included offerees.
Because no special verdict form was used,
and because it was possible that the jury relied
upon Subsection 58-37d-4(lXa) in reaching its
verdict, which includes ail the elements for
conviction of possession of a controlled sub*
stance precursor, the defendant was entitled to
reversal of his conviction for possession of a

Sufficiency of evidence.
Where the defendant did not acknowledge,
let alone marshal, the evidence presented at
trial, but described onlyfragmentedportions of
the evidence, the Supreme Court H — I ^ ^ to
consider his contention that the evidence was
insufficient for conviction. State v. Hopkins,
1999 UT 98, 989 P.2d 1066.

AKALTOB

RULE 608. EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER AND CONDUCT OP WITNESS

(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character. The credibility of a
witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only
to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness for
truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a
witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility,
other than conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by
extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning the witness1 character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the
witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does
not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness* privilege against
self-incrimination when examined with respect to nnatters which relate only to
credibility.
(c) Evidence of Bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by
evidence otherwise adduced.

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

ADDENDUM B

RANDALL GATTHER
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW
321 SOUTH 600 EAST
SALT LAKH CITY, UTAH 64102
TELEPHONE: (801)53M990
FACSIMILE (801) 53U1992 (9.U0A-H.- 5>00P.M.)

March 6,2000

John L. Allen
Utah County Attorney's Office
100 Hast Center Street Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
deliver via fax: (801) 370-8051
Re: State v. Brie B. Libby
Dear John,
This letter will confirm our agreement that Mr. Libby will appear for a change of
plea on March 10,2000 to plea guilty to die third-degree felony before the drug Court
On his behalf, I would offer me following evidence concerning his involvement and his
knowledge of the offense:
1. On the evening of the arrest my client was present when Joyce called Marchant
at Mr. Libby's house, telephone number 785-8004.
2. Mr. Marchant indicated after die call that he was going to pick up his sister's
coat which was at theraoteLAt the timeMr. Marchant and Mr. Libby had been drinking
quite a bh and was under die impression that they would meet with someone to get high
that evening but had no specific plans. They left Mr. Libby's residence in Mr. Libby's
vehicle and went to the motet
3. Inside the motel they went to the secondfloorand knocked on the door. At that
time Joyce and JoAnn were sleeping. During the period of time that they were there a
girl arrived who was heavy set, my client does not presently recall her name but could be
refreshed as to her name. Also, during that time one of the girls ex-husband came over.
My client testifies that most of the time he was laying on one of the two beds and Mr.
Marchant and Joyce were on the other bed.

4. During die day evening before the police arrived, he noticed Mike starting to
set up glassware and he was able to make the observations when laying on the bed by the
mirror on the wall. He also saw containers of liquid which contained chemicals.
5. He will indicate that there was a large glass condenser that was hooked up and
it appeared that they were condensing substances to produce methamphetamine.
6. He will testify that the process was ongoing when the police knocked and when
the police were present and he saw JoAnn cut her hand while she was trying to break up
the condenser and glassware before the police arrived.
7. This is a general outline that he may testify and is taken from my notes. Mr.
Libby will be happy to meet with you to go over in detail his recollections of the event.

JDAU/GA1THER
Attorney at Law
RG/cp
cc: Eric Libby

?• ^JoyC^Z

kq[7+ ^-^illAJff Ik*

J~b yfte99 up her

«s>+u<-(\ .<?k* jai/<.

(O

Vy

+14/0/7^6**/

-?0<5O

